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1. Introduction. 
Dempster-Shafer's model aims at 
quantifying degrees of belief. But there are 
so many interpretations of Dempster­
Shafer's theory in the literature that it 
seems useful to present the various 
contenders in order to clarify their 
respective positions. 
We shall successively consider the classical 
probability model, the upper and lower 
probabilities model, Dempster's model, the 
transferable belief model, the evidentiary 
value model, the provability or necessity 
model. 
As seen none of these has received the 
qualification of Dempster-Shafer. In fact 
the transferable belief model is our 
interpretation not of Dempster's work but 
of Shafer's work as presented in his book 
(Shafer 1976, Smets 1988). It is a 
'purified' form of Dempster-Shafer's 
model in which any connection with 
probability concept has been deleted. 
1 Research has partly been supported by the 
Belgian National Incentive-Program for 
Fundamental Research in Artificial Intelligence 
Gnd the DRUMS (Defeasable reasoning and 
Uncertainty Management Systems) project funded 
by EEC grants under the ESPRIT II Basic Research 
Project 3085. 
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Any model for belief has at least two 
components: one static that describes our 
state of belief, the other dynamic that 
explains how to update our belief given 
new pieces of information. We insist on the 
fact that both components must be 
considered in order to study these models. 
Too many authors restrict themselves to the 
static component and conclude that 
Dempster-Shafer theory is the same as 
some other theory. But once the dynamic 
component is considered, these 
conclusions break down. Any comparison 
based only on the static component is too 
restricted. The dynamic component must 
also be considered as the originality of the 
models based on belief functions lies in its 
dynamic component 
We present a short summary of each 
theory. 
2. The probability model. 
In probability theory, the s t a t ic 
component consists of the assessment of 
a probability density p on the elements of 
n such that p: n�ro. 11. :L p (ro > = 1. 
roen 
Degrees of belief on subsets of n are 
quantified by a probability distribution 
P:20� [0, 1] such that 'V roe n, P( { ro}) = 
p (ro) and 'VA, B� !l with An B=0, 
P(AuB) = P(A) + P(B) 
The dynamic component is the 
conditioning rule: when you learn that 
B�!l is true (and if P (B):;fQ), P is updated 
into the conditional probability distribution 
P(AnB) 
P(. IB) defmed on 20 as P(AIB) = P (B) 
3. Upper and lower probabilities 
models 
An upper and lower probabilities model is 
identical to the probability model except 
inasmuch as it acknowledges that some 
probabilities might be unknown. Let IT be 
the set of all those probability distributions 
compatible with the available information. 
Instead of building a meta-probability 
distribution on IT as strict bayesians would 
recommend, one considers critical values -
usually the extremes - of the various 
probabilities one is interested in. Various 
forms of partially known probability 
models can be described. Often TI is a 
convex set of probability distributions 
(Kyburg 1987) uniquely defined through 
its upper and lower probabilities functions 
P* and P* where 
'VA �.0 P*(A) = sup Pen P(A) 
P*(A) = inf Pen P(A) 
When n contains only one element, the 
model reduces itself into the classical 
probability model. 
In the classic upper and lower probabilities 
model, the static component consists in 
defining the upper probability distribution 
P* or the lower probability distribution P*, 
both from 2n to [0, 1]. Both approaches 
are identical as P*(A) = 1 - P*( A) 'VA (;.0. 
For each P in n, one has: 
for all A!:.O, P*(A) :S: P(A) :s; P*(A) 
The dynamic component is the conditioning 
process. Conditioning on B�Q is obtained 
by considering each probability distribution 
P in IT, and conditioning them on B. Let 
IT B be the resulting set of conditional 
probability distributions: 
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ITB = { PB: 'v' A�.O PB(A) = P(AIB) 
P(AnB) 
= P(B) ,PeTI} 
The upper and lower conditional 
probabilities functions are the upper and 
lower limits of these conditional 
probabilities: 
for all A�n. P*(AIB) = infPsena Ps(A) 
P*(AilB) 
= infpe n P(AIB) = __ __;__----==--
P*(AnB)+P*(AriB) 
P*(AIB) = SUPJ>sena Ps(A) 
= su P(AIB) = 
P*(AfiB) 
pPe n P*(AnB)+P*(AriB) 
These equations have been recently studied 
by Planchet (1989) and Fagin and Halpern 
(1990). 
4. Dempster's model. 
Dempster ( 1967) introduced a special form 
of upper and lower probabilities model. 
For the static component of the model, 
he considers a space X endowed with a 
probability distribution Px and a mapping 
M from space X to space 2Y. Let M(x) 
denotes the image of x under M for xe X. 
He defines upper and lower probabilities 
distribution P* and P* on 2 Y such that for 
allA�Y: 
P*(A) = Px(M*(A)) 
and P*(A) = Px(M*(A)) 
where M*(A) = { x: xeX, M(x)<;;A, 
M(x)*0} 
and M*(A) = { x: xe X, M(x)flA¢0}. 
The functions P* and P* are a belief and a 
plausibility function, respectively (see §5). 
Let Py be the (unknown) probability 
distribution on 2 Y induced by Px and the 
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mapping M. One way to derive P*(A) 
consists in writing 
P*(A) = inf l: Py(Aix).Px(x) ":/A <.: Y 
xeX 
where the inf is taken over all possible 
values of the Py(Aix). One has Py(Aix) = 1 
whenever M(x)<.:A and anything in [0,1] 
otherwise. The minimum is obtained by 
taking Py(Aix) = 0 whenever possible. 
Hence: 
P*(A) = l: Px(x) = Px(M*(A)). 
x:M(x)<.:A 
For the dynamic component of the 
model, two types of conditioning can be 
considered. The first is related to upper and 
lower probabilities theory: 
2, Py(AilBix).Px(x) 
xeX 
P*(AIB) = inf --------1: Py(Bix).Px(x) 
xeX 
P*(AilB) 
=-----=--
where the inf is taken over all possible 
values of the Py(Aix). This conditioning, 
hereafter called the G-conditioning,n 
corresponds to the solution described in the 
upper and lower probabilities model in §3. 
It is not the one considered by Dempster. 
For the second form of conditioning on 
B <.: Y, one considers that the mapping 
M :  X -+  2 Y has been transformed into 
mapping MB:X-+2Y with: 
MB(x) = M(x)llB. 
The image of each xe X is constrained to 
be in B. One postulates also that the 
information B does not modify Px, i.e. 
Px(xiB) = Px(x). In that case 
P*(AIB) = inf l: PyiB(Aix).Px(x) 
xeX 
P*(AIB) =sup l: PyiB(Aix).Px(x) 
xeX 
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where PYIB (Aix) = 1 whenever 
M (x)ll B �A and anything in [0, 1] 
otherwise. Then 
P*(AuB) - P*(i�) 
P*(AIB) = __ ___;_ _ ___.:...__;_ 
1 - P*(B) 
P*(AIB)-
P*(AilB) 
- P*(B) 
what we call the D-conditioning. 
Dempster -Shafer's  model of ten 
corresponds to this interpretation, i.e. 
Dempster's model endowed with the D­
conditioning rule. 
An important point in Dempster's model is 
that one recognizes the existence of a 
probability distribution on Y. The statement 
P*(A) S Py(A) S P*(A) is meaningful as 
Py(A) exists even though its exact value is 
unknown. It is not the case with the 
transferable belief model (§5) where no 
concept of probability distribution on Y is 
assumed or required. 
Levi (1983) strongly criticizes the 
assumption Px(xiB) = Px(x). Whenever 
probabilities are assumed on X and Y, one 
must justify why the information B leaves 
our probability distribution on X 
unchanged. One way to avert this criticism 
would be to avoid any reference to some 
underlying probability distribution. This is 
what we try to do in our transferable belief 
model interpretation of Dempster-Shafer's 
theory. 
5. The transferable belief model 
The transferable belief model is a model 
unrelated to any probability assumption. 
It is postulated that evidence induces us in 
allocating parts of some initial finite amount 
of belief to subsets of the frame of 
discernment n. Instead of allocating these 
parts of belief to the singletons of n as in 
probability theory, some parts may also be 
allocated to subsets. Each part represents 
that part of our belief that supports some 
subset of n without supporting strict 
subsets. Should further information be 
available, that part of belief m(A) allocated 
to A �  Q might be transferred to strict 
subsets of A. The static component of 
the transferable belief model corresponds to 
this mass allocation. 
One defines the degree of belief bel(A) 
given to the set A of Q is defined as the 
sum of all masses that support A, 
bel(A) = I, m(X) 
0¢X�A 
and the degree of plausibility function 
pl(A) quantifies the total amount of belief 
that might support A: 
pl(A) = bel(Q) - bel(A) = I, m (X) 
XllA� 
For the dynamic component, suppose a 
mass m(A) (called a basic belief mass) 
supporting a set A of n. You learn that 
subset X of n is impossible. The basic 
belief mass supporting A initially now 
supports An X. So the basic belief mass 
m(A) is transferred to An X, hence the 
name of the model. This corresponds to 
Dempster's rule of conditioning. 
The transferable belief model claims that 
beliefs are quantified by a single number 
(bel). It is not an upper and lower 
probabilities model. It is a form of 
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Dempster-Shafer's model where all 
relations with probability theory are 
cancelled. It is based essentially on 
Shafer's work (1976), see also Smets 
(1988). 
The transferable belief model is not a 
particular case or a generalization of some 
probability models, nor of any meta-model 
based on probability distributions. Any 
interpretation implying the existence of an 
underlying probability distribution is 
irrelevant to our approach. We only 
postulate the existence of the basic belief 
masses assigned to subsets A of n, each 
expressing the support given specifically to 
A and that could be transferred to strict 
subsets of A should new pieces of evidence 
become available (the conditioning 
process). 
6. Other interpretations of belief 
functions. 
6.1. Evidentiary Value Model. 
Ekelof (1982) initially suggested a theory 
of evidentiary value in judicial context (see 
Gardenf6rs et al (1983) for a survey of the 
topic). The model is very close to 
Dempster-Shafer's model and the 
transferable belief model. 
An evidentiary argument contains three 
components (Gardenfors 1983): 
- an evidentiary theme that is to be proved 
-evidentiary facts 
• evidentiary mechanisms which say that 
en evidentiary fact is caused by an 
evidentiary theme. 
For these authors, the probability that the 
evidentiary mechanism has worked given 
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the evidentiary facts is more important 
judicially than the probability of the 
evidentiary theme given the evidentiary 
facts. 
In some cases, the model gives the same 
results as Dempster'smodel, but counter­
examples can be built up that show the two 
models to be different 
6.2. Probability of provability or 
necessity. 
Pearl (1988) interprets Dempster-Shafer's 
model as a model to quantify the 
probability that a proposition is provable, 
not that a proposition is true. Ruspini 
(1986) considers that bel(A) is the 
probability that A is necessary (DA). bel(A) 
could be interpreted as the sum of the 
probabilities p(w; wi=DA) of those worlds 
w where A is necessary. Both 
interpretations are in fact identical. They fit 
in with the static component of 
Dempster-Shafer's theory. Indeed if bel(A) 
= p(DA), then all inequalities characterizing 
the belief functions are satisfied. 
But the dynamic component has to be 
justified. What is the conditioning process? 
Is Dempster's rule of conditioning the 
appropriate rule for conditioning? The 
problem of conditioning has apparently not 
yet been solved. We nevertheless believe 
that there is an open opportunity to show 
that the transferable belief model is 
analogous to a model where bel(A) is 
interpreted as p(DA) once the conditioning 
process is understood. 
7. What is Conditioning. 
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The static component of each model is 
important, but the dynamic component is 
even more important, though too often 
neglected. So we shall concentrate here 
more specifically on the conditioning 
process and Dempster's rule of 
conditioning through the study of the 
paradigm1 of the three soldiers (Sl ,  S2 and 
S3) and the three posts (Pl, P2 and P3). 
Let an army camp with three posts, only 
one of them must be occupied. The officer 
will randomly select (with probability 1/3) 
one of the three soldiers. Each soldier has a 
habit in that 
- if soldier S 1 is selected, he will always go 
to post Pl or P2, 
- if soldier S2 is selected, he will always go 
to post Pl or P2 or P3, 
- if soldier S3 is selected, he will always go 
to post Pl. 
Before the officer selects the soldier on 
duty, each of them writes down on a piece 
of paper where he will go if selected. There 
are therefore six possible worlds, w 1 to 
w6, where each world corresponds to one 
particular post selection (see left pan of 
table 1 ). As the officer can select any one 
of the three guards, 18 possible worlds can 
be defined (referred as worlds wij if soldier 
Sj is selected and we were in world wi). 
I want to attack the camp. I know the 
soldiers' preferences, how the officer 
selects the guard on duty, that a guard has 
been selected, but I do not know who. My 
problem is to assess my belief about which 
post is occupied. With the transferable 
belief model, bel(Pl) = 1/3 (S3 was 
selected), bel(P2) = 0, bel(P1 vP2) = 2/3 
1 This is an updated version of our beehive 
paradigm based on Hsia suggestions. 
occupied post 
post selected according to the 
by each soldier soldier selected 
world S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 
w1 P1 P1 P1 P1 P1 P1 
w2 P1 P2 P1 P1 P2 P1 
w3 P1 P3 P1 P1 P3 PI 
w4 P2 P1 PI P2 PI PI 
w5 P2 P2 Pl P2 P2 Pl 
w6 P2 P3 Pl P2 P3 P1 
1/3 1/3 113 
probabilities of being selected 
Table 1: the set of six worlds that 
represent the six possible ways posts could 
be selected by each soldier, and the post 
occupied according to which soldier has 
been selected by the officer. 
(Sl or S3 was selected) ... Three cases of 
conditioning can then be considered. 
Case 1: I learn (and the soldiers know it 
too) that post P2 is inaccessible, so the 
soldiers will not select P2 if they can go 
elsewhere. Hence the worlds w2, w4, w5 
and w6 become impossible. My beliefs 
about which post is occupied become: 
bel(P1) = 2/3 (S1 or S3 was selected), 
bel(P3) = 0, bel(P1vP3) = 1. 
Case 2: I am able to observe post P2 and 
realize it is empty. Hence the guard on duty 
had not selected P2 before being assigned 
the job. Hence the worlds w22, w41, w51, 
w52 and w61 become impossible. My 
beliefs are identical to those in case 1. 
Case 3: I learn that soldier S3 was not 
selected. I rescale the probabilities on the 
space (S1, S2, S3) into P(S1) = P(S2) = 
1/2. Hence bel(P1) = 0, bel(P2) = 0, 
bel(P1vP2) = 1/2 (Sl was selected) ... 
331 
remaining worlds remaining worlds 
after case 1 after case 2 
conditioning conditioning 
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 
P1 P1 P1 P1 P1 P1 
P1 P1 
P1 P3 P1 PI P3 P1 
PI PI 
Pl 
P3 P1 
To show the difference between case 1 and 
case 2, suppose I learn that soldier S2 had 
decided that if S1 selected post Pl, S2 
would not select P3. Hence world w3 is 
impossible. 
Case 1: Only world w1 remains possible, 
hence bel(Pl) = 1. 
Case 2: Delete also worlds w31, w32 and 
w33. The bel(P1) = 213 (S1 or S3 was 
selected), bel(P3) = 0 and bel(P1 vP3) = 1. 
Case 3: Unchanged. 
The transferable belief model is applicable 
in the three cases. Case 3 is purely 
probabilist. In case 1, a probabilist 
approach will probably lead to a solution 
similar to the one found with the 
transferable belief model. The real 
originality of the transferable belief model 
lies in the way case 2 is handled. 
Probabilists might be tempted to defend the 
idea that the 1/3 probabilities present in the 
soldier selection process should be 
updated. Indeed, they could contend that 
the fact that P2 is not occupied somehow 
supports the hypothesis that soldier S2 was 
more probably selected than soldier S 1. 
Hence the probabilities P' updated by the 
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knowledge that P2 is empty should be such 
that P'(S2)>P'(S 1). That is what Levi 
requires in his criticisms. The answer is 
that no probability is built on the wij space. 
So the fact that there are fewer remaining 
possible worlds for S 1 than for S2 ( 4 
versus 3) is irrelevant. 
Case 2 conditioning corresponds to 
Dempster's rule of conditioning. Case 1 
conditioning does not, and is usually not 
considered in Shafer's translators 
paradigms. It corresponds to the 
conditioning on the fact that some 
messages that were initially considered as 
possible were in fact not possible. Case 3 
conditioning was given for sake of 
completeness. 
8. Conclusions. 
Consider the mapping M between the X 
and 2 Y as presented in paragraph 4.1. The 
major difference between the transferable 
belief and probability approaches lies of 
course in the way we create our beliefs on 
Y knowing the belief on X. The 
transferable belief model is based on what 
is available and nothing else whereas the 
probability analysis requires the existence 
of a probability distribution on Y. 
Bayesians assume that whenever a 
probability distribution Px is defmed on X, 
then one can describe a probability 
distribution Py on Y where Py satisfies the 
constraints induced by Px. 
All alternatives to the transferable belief 
model explicitly or implicitly accept the 
Bayesian assumption: the existence of 
probability distributions on all relevant 
spaces. The real difference between the 
transferable belief model and all its 
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contenders lies in this assumption. Accept 
it and Levi's remarks are adequate. In the 
transferable belief model, one never 
requires the existence of these probability 
distributions. One only recognizes that if a 
probability distribution can be defined on 
some algebra, it should induce coherence 
constraints on the way beliefs are allocated. 
But never infer that a probability 
distribution exists on those spaces on 
which we vacuously extend the belief 
function derived from the initial probability 
constraints. 
Claiming the existence of a probability 
distribution on the space on which our 
beliefs are assessed is in itself already an 
information. Should you accept it, then the 
upper and lower probabilities model is 
appropriate. 
We strongly reject the following 
interpretation where belief functions are 
used instead of upper and lower 
probabilities. Some authors consider that 
Dempster-Shafer's model (i.e. belief and 
plausibility functions) can be used to 
handle cases of ill defmed probabilities, 
cases where there is a probability function 
on .Q but we only know that its values for 
each A �.Q is contained between two limits. 
They claim that all that is known is a belief 
function bel (or equivalently a plausibility 
function pl as pl(A) = 1- bel( A)) such that 
VA�.Q bel(A) S P(A) S pl(A) 
This might be the case but then they should 
justify why the lower limits are quantified 
by a belief function (which can be done as 
in Dempster-Shafer theory). But once 
conditioning is involved, how do they 
justify the use of the D-conditioning and 
not of the G-conditioning. These questions 
have to be answered before using belief 
functions instead of lower probabilities 
functions as lower limits for the intervals 
and before using Dempster's rule of 
conditioning (and Dempster's rule of 
combination). Too often authors mix the 
two theories, carelessly introducing 
Dempster's rule of conditioning in an upper 
and lower probabilities context (see 
Halpern and Fagin 1990). This explains 
why we felt it would be useful to write this 
paper; hopefully we have succeeded in 
somehow clarifying matters. 
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